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Abstract
Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005) has argued that competition in the
loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. We
show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can
adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks
want to oﬀset the eﬀect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They
even overcompensate the eﬀect of safer borrowers because loan market competition
erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.
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11 Introduction
Competition in the banking sector is typically seen as detrimental to ﬁnancial stability.
The basic idea is that when banks compete intensely for deposits, interest rates fall and
their franchise value is eroded. Banks have then less to lose from a default and their
incentives to take on risk increase.1 This argument has been very important in shaping
banking regulation around the world, for instance in the form of competition and merger
policies.
A recent inﬂuential paper by Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) has challenged this view.
Boyd and De Nicoló (BdN, henceforth) start from the simple observation that when banks
compete more in the deposit market, they are also likely to compete more in the loan
market. Loan rates should hence decline. BdN show that this gives rise to a new channel
which operates through the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. First, lower loan rates
raise proﬁts for borrowers and thus make bankruptcy less likely. Moreover, for the same
reason that banks choose higher risk when deposit rates increase, borrowers choose to be
safer when loan rates decrease. Both eﬀects reduce the riskiness of bank loans and thus
counter the traditional channel. BdN consequently argue that the lending market should
be central to future models of bank stability.
In this paper we extend the analysis of the lending channel. In BdN borrowers are
implicitly assumed, through their inﬂuence on the risk of ﬁrms, to have complete control
over the riskiness of banks. We argue that, while borrowers may determine the riskiness of
their ﬁrms, it is banks who decide how much risk they ultimately want to take on. They
do this, for example, by deciding how much to lend in total or whether or not to lend to
risky industries. Banks also determine the risk of their loan portfolio through their lending
standards, screening and monitoring eﬀorts and through loan restrictions. To allow for
this, we introduce in a model with a lending channel as in BdN the possibility for banks to
select among diﬀerent types of borrowers. Thus, we essentially allow for both a risk choice
of borrowers as in BdN and a risk choice for banks.
We ﬁnd that this alteration reverses the stability eﬀect of the lending channel. The
reason is as follows. Banks can be thought of as having an optimal amount of risk they
want to take on, which balances higher returns when they survive with the costs of a
larger probability of default. As a result, when borrowers become less risky because of
lower lending rates, banks want to oﬀset this eﬀect on their balance sheet. In our model
they do this by channeling lending to borrowers with riskier project types (for example, by
1See, among others, Keeley (1990), Allen and Gale (2000), Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) and
Repullo (2004).
2increasing lending to high-risk industries).
In principal, as long as banks’ optimal amount of risk does not change, this adjustment
would perfectly neutralize the initial stability eﬀect of safer borrowers. However, for the
same reason that banks’ risk-taking incentives increase when deposit rates rise, banks’
desired risk-taking also increases when loan rates fall. Therefore, banks ultimately want to
overcompensate the initial fall in their riskiness. Hence, allowing for banks’ ability to adjust
their risk, the lending channel may reinforce the deposit channel, rather than countering
it.2
The empirical evidence on the relationship between competition in the banking sector
and bank risk-taking is mixed. However, most papers do not distinguish between compe-
tition in the loan and the deposit market, and measure competition only indirectly.3 In
a recent paper, Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina (2007) develop a direct test of the lending
channel by constructing a Lerner index of competition in the loan market. They ﬁnd that
loan market competition increases bank risk (as measured by the share of non-performing
loans). This lends support to our argument that banks have an incentive to more than
overcompensate any impact safer borrowers may have on their balance sheet.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we ﬁrst provide a simpliﬁed exposition of
the main argument. Section 3 then contains the full analysis of competition in the lending
market. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 A Sketch of the Argument
Suppose there is a continuum of diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs, indexed with k. Their
projects either succeed and give a positive return, or fail and return nothing. Entrepreneurs
can set the risk of their projects (denoted with s), where a higher s is associated with a
lower probability of project success p. The project requires one unit of funds. Entrepreneurs
have no funds of their own and have to borrow from a bank at an interest rate r.
An entrepreneur’s risk choice s depends on two factors: the loan rate r and his type
k. A higher loan rate causes him to increase project risk. This is because larger interest
2Other recent literature has extended the lending channel in diﬀerent directions. Martínez and Repullo
(2006) show that competition in the loan market may undermine bank stability by reducing banks’ margins.
They demonstrate that this can give rise to a U-shaped relation between competition and stability. Boyd,
De Nicolo and Jalal (2006) study the empirical consequences of banks investing also in safe assets (besides
loans). Hakenes and Schnabel (2007) ﬁnd that competition in the lending market may induce banks to
alter the correlation of the loans in their portfolio, with the eﬀect potentially going either way.
3Nevertheless, the majority of the papers seem to support the traditional view of a negative relationship
between competition and stability. For an overview of the empirical work see, for example, Boyd, De Nicoló
and Jalal (2006) and Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina (2007).
3payments reduce the entrepreneur’s pay-oﬀ from success but do not aﬀect his pay-oﬀ when
the project fails (since he then defaults). Therefore he suﬀers less from the failure of the
project and hence has an incentive to choose more risk. The new element we consider is
that his risk choice also depends on his type k, where the convention is that a higher k is
associated with more risk s. One can think of this heterogeneity in risk choices as being the
result of entrepreneurs diﬀering with respect to the risk-return trade-oﬀ of their projects
or their risk preferences.
The timing is as follows. A bank ﬁrst selects an entrepreneur k and sets the loan rate
r. The loan rate depends on the level of concentration in the banking sector (which we
denote with c) such that the bank can set a higher loan rate when the banking sector
is more concentrated (less competitive). Next, the entrepreneur chooses risk s (which is
unobservable). Afterwards, the bank raises funds at rate rD through deposits to ﬁnance
the loan. The bank’s return when the entrepreneur’s project survives is hence r − rD.
When the project fails, the entrepreneur cannot pay back. The bank then defaults and its
pay-oﬀ is zero. Hence, the bank’s overall expected return is
π = (r − r
D)p(s). (1)
We ﬁrst demonstrate the argument of BdN. Their result obtains for a given k. The
riskiness of the bank is then solely determined by the entrepreneur’s risk choice s. An
increase in competition in the banking sector lowers the interest rate r the bank can
charge. This in turn raises the entrepreneur’s gains from project success and causes him
to choose lower risk (s declines), which improves the stability of the bank.
Suppose now that the bank can choose among the entrepreneurs. For a selected type
k, the loan rate r the bank can charge is determined by the level of concentration. Thus,
also the entrepreneur’s risk choice s (which depends on k and r) is determined. Hence,
one can alternatively view the bank’s problem as one of choosing an optimal s through
an appropriate selection of k. In particular, one may consider a function k(s) which gives
the k that has to be selected by the bank in order to obtain a risk choice of s. Since
entrepreneurs with higher k choose higher risk, we have k￿(s) > 0 (primes denote total
derivatives with respect to induced risk s). There is also a function r(s), which gives the
interest rate that corresponds to a risk choice s (and thus an entrepreneur k(s)).
For a bank that optimizes over s, we can rewrite its return as
π(s) = (r(s) − r
D)p(s). (2)
and its ﬁrst order condition is
r
￿(s)p(s) = (r(s) − r
D)(−ps) (3)
4(where subindices denote partial derivatives). The left hand side of (3) represents the
bank’s marginal beneﬁts from higher risk s. They arise because high entrepreneurial risk is
associated with high interest rates (r￿(s) > 0) and thus large gains for the bank when the
project succeeds. The right hand side gives us the marginal costs of risk. When the bank
induces a higher s (by choosing a higher k) the likelihood of project success is reduced
(ps < 0). Hence, there are less states in which the bank receives the payoﬀ r(s) − rD.
The impact of competition is as follows. As before, competition reduces the interest
rate r, hence r(s) falls. This lowers the bank’s return from project success (r(s)−rD falls)
and reduces the bank’s marginal costs of risk-taking (the right hand side of (3) declines).
Bank’s risk-taking incentives (for a given s) thus increase. Hence, the bank will respond
with inducing a higher s, which is achieved by switching to more risky entrepreneurs.
3 The Model in Detail
Our model is based on BdN but there are also diﬀerences. As already mentioned, we in-
troduce the possibility for banks to choose between diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs (but
entrepreneurs still determine the risk level of their projects, as in BdN). Moreover, we shut
down the traditional channel by assuming that interest rates in the deposit market are
given. We can thus isolate the eﬀect of competition in the lending market (incorporating
the traditional channel would only strengthen our results). It also serves to simplify the
analysis by allowing us to keep the number of projects ﬁnanced by a bank constant. Finally,
we model competition diﬀerently. In BdN increased competition is due to an increase in
the number of banks that compete in a Cournot fashion. Since we have a continuum of
entrepreneur types here (rather than a single type as in BdN), this setup would pose some
technical diﬃculties because banks would then play Cournot in a large number of (inter-
acting) markets. Instead, we model more intense competition through declining switching
costs for entrepreneurs when they want to move to another bank.
3.1 Setup
There are two dates (0 and 1) and three classes of agents: depositors, entrepreneurs and
banks. All agents are risk neutral. Depositors are insured, so their required interest
rate is risk-insensitive. Hence a bank can raise funds at a constant rate rD (this rate
may also include a (ﬂat) deposit insurance premium). Entrepreneur-types k are from a
continuum [kmin,kmax]. An entrepreneur k’s project pays in the case of success s − k, and
zero otherwise. The probability of success is given by p(s) with ps < 0. Entrepreneurs can
choose s, that is the risk of the project. The following conditions on p(s) ensure concavity
5of the entrepreneur’s problem: p(0) = 1, p(s) = 0 and ps < 0, ps,s < 0 on s ∈ [0,s].
Because of lower beneﬁts in the case of project success, an entrepreneur with higher k,
ceteris paribus, chooses higher risk s.4,5 The projects in BdN would obtain if k were the
same for all entrepreneurs (and speciﬁcally set to zero).
There is a single bank which has the capacity to process one loan application (for
example because of limited screening capacities). Without processing the loan application,
repayment on the loan would be zero. The bank can thus only ﬁnance one entrepreneur. At
an intermediate stage, there is potential entry by another bank who can make a competing
loan oﬀer for the entrepreneur.6 If the entrepreneur switches banks at this stage, he incurs
costs c > 0.
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows. At date 0, the bank chooses
an entrepreneur k and processes his loan application. The bank subsequently makes a loan
oﬀer r to the entrepreneur. Afterwards, the potential entrant (seeing the oﬀer of the bank)
can make a competing oﬀer ￿ r (this can be interpreted as entrepreneurs ‘shopping around’
with their ﬁrst loan oﬀer). The entrepreneur then decides which oﬀer to take and chooses
risk s. At the last stage, the winning bank raises one unit of deposits at rate rD. At date
1, the state of nature realizes. When the project fails, the entrepreneur, and as a result
also the bank, default. When the project succeeds, returns are consumed by the respective
agents.
3.2 Solution
We solve the model backwards. The last decision is the entrepreneur’s risk choice. Given
loan rate r and his type k, he chooses s to maximize the expected pay-oﬀ from the project
net of the interest rate payment
(s − k − r)p(s). (4)
Note that potential switching costs c are sunk at the time and do not aﬀect the optimal s.
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is
p + (s − k − r)ps = 0. (5)
4Note that the expected return on a project is declining in k (for a given s). Thus, our setup allows for
a natural bias against selecting higher risk entrepreneurs when competition increases.
5An alternative interpretation of k is that it is the part of an entrepreneur’s project risk that can
be inﬂuenced through the loan contract (for example, through covenants and collateral). Yet another
interpretation is that k stands for (lower) monitoring and screening eﬀorts.
6Equivalently, there could be many banks (each having limited loan processing capacities) which com-
pete for each others’ customers.
6We write s = s(r,k) to indicate the dependence of the entrepreneur’s choice of s on r and
k. From ps < 0 and ps,s < 0 it follows that
ds(r,k)
dr > 0 and
ds(r,k)
dk > 0, that is risk increases
both in r and k.
In the preceding stage, the entrepreneur chooses whether to switch to the entrant.
Given switching costs c he stays at his bank if
(s(r) − k − r)p(s(r)) ≥ (s(￿ r) − k − ￿ r)p(s(￿ r)) − c (6)
i.e., if his pay-oﬀ from staying is not below the pay-oﬀ from accepting the entrant’s oﬀer
and incurring the switching costs.
In the second stage, loan rates are set. The lowest interest rate the entrant can set
without making a loss is ￿ r = rD, that is to oﬀer the deposit rate. We denote with sD =
s(rD) an entrepreneur’s risk choice when the loan rate is rD, and with uD his resulting
pay-oﬀ (gross of any switching costs). From (4) and (5), sD and uD are deﬁned by
p(s
D) + (s
D − k − r
D)ps(s
D) = 0 (7)
u
D := (s
D − k − r
D)p(s
D). (8)
Thus, the entrant can oﬀer the entrepreneur a (net) pay-oﬀ of up to uD − c. Therefore,
the maximum interest rate r the (incumbent) bank can set without losing the entrepreneur
fulﬁlls
(s − k − r)p(s) = u
D − c (9)
Recall that s = s(r), that is the loan rate aﬀects the entrepreneur’s risk choice. In principal,
it may hence be optimal for the bank to set an interest rate lower than this maximum one.
However, we assume that this is not the case because competition from the entrant would
then not be binding.7
Finally, in the ﬁrst stage the bank selects the type of entrepreneur it wants to ﬁnance.
Speciﬁcally, it chooses k to maximize its expected returns
π = (r − r
D)p(s) (10)
subject to r and s fulﬁlling (5) and (9). Note that although k has no direct inﬂuence on
proﬁts, it has an indirect one through the interest rate r and the risk choice s. In the case
of s it can be seen from (5) that k aﬀects s both directly, and indirectly through the impact
of k on r.
7Note that competition always becomes binding when c is suﬃciently small because the maximum
interest rate then becomes close to rD.
73.3 Competition and Bank Risk-Taking
To analyze the impact of competition it is useful to restate the bank’s optimization problem.
Since a bank’s choice of k maps into a risk choice s, we can also consider the bank’s problem
as one of choosing s in order to maximize π. The entrepreneur who needs to be selected
to induce a certain s, and the interest rate that results from this choice, are implicitly
deﬁned by (5) and (9). We write k(s) and r(s) in the following to indicate the k and r
that correspond to a risk choice s.
Consider now the impact of a small change in (induced) risk on bank’s equity, i.e., the
bank’s marginal gains from risk-taking. From (10) we have
π
￿(s) = r
￿(s)p + (r − r
D)ps. (11)
We want to show that a reduction in c (that is, an increase in competition) raises risk-
taking s. For this we derive that the bank’s marginal risk-taking gains π￿(s) at a given
s = s increase when c falls. This amounts to showing that if the bank following a reduction
in c (hypothetically) adjusts k such that its previous risk level s is restored, its risk-taking
gains are still higher than before the reduction in c. From this it follows that a bank
implements an s that is higher than the one that was optimal before the reduction in c.
Formally, we have to show that
dπ￿(s)










since d(p(s))/dc = 0 and d(ps(s))/dc = 0.
Lemma 1 We have
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dc = 0: Rearranging the entrepreneur’s ﬁrst order condition (equation 5)
for r gives




Taking the total derivative with respect to s yields
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Combining the entrepreneur’s ﬁrst order condition (5) and the interest rate determination

























Note that k￿(s) > 0 (since ps,s < 0), conﬁrming that when the bank wants to induce more
risk, it has to pick an entrepreneur with higher k. It follows from (18) that
dk￿(s)
dc = 0 and























dc , inserting into (19) and using uD




Hence we have with (12) that
dπ￿(s)
dc < 0, that is risk-taking increases when competition
intensiﬁes. The reason is that competition leaves the bank’s marginal beneﬁts of risk
unaﬀected (
dr￿(s)
dc p(s) = 0) but reduces its marginal costs (
dr(s)
dc p(s) > 0). The latter is
because a lower c erodes the bank’s monopoly power and forces it to reduce the interest
rate r, which in turn makes risk-taking more desirable.
4 Conclusions
Understanding the relationship between competition and banking stability is of paramount
importance for designing banking regulation and may ultimately help to mitigate the risk
of ﬁnancial crises. The traditional view has held that competition in the banking sector is
detrimental for stability since it tends to increase deposit rates and thus erodes the franchise
value of banks. Recent literature has challenged this view and has emphasized that there
is a counteracting channel, which operates through the loan market. The argument is that
competition among banks tends to reduce loan rates, which makes borrowers safer precisely
for the same reason that banks become riskier when deposit rates rise.
In this paper we have shown that when banks have control over their risk-taking, the
stability impact of lending market competition reverses. This is because banks have an
9optimal amount of risk they want to hold and thus want to oﬀset the impact of safer
borrowers on their balance sheet by taking on more risk. Since competition in the loan
market at the same time erodes banks’ franchise values, they even want to overcompensate
the impact of safer borrowers because their risk-taking incentives increase.
Banks arguably have plenty of opportunities to modify their risk-taking. They may
direct lending to riskier projects (as in our model) but may also raise risk through various
other channels, such as by weakening lending standards, reducing monitoring and screening
eﬀorts or lowering loan restrictions. There are also many ways for banks to adjust their risk
beyond their loan portfolios. For example, they can invest more in risky (non-loan) assets
or increase leverage. We thus conclude that under plausible conditions the lending channel
may reinforce the adverse impact of deposit market competition on stability, rather than
countering it. Recent empirical work supports this view by showing that lending market
competition increases bank risk, suggesting that banks more than oﬀset any potential eﬀect
safer borrowers may have on their balance sheet.
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